Testimony of

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INTRODUCTION AND SUMMARY

Mr. Chairman and Members of the Committee, it is a pleasure to appear today to testify on American policy toward United Nations peacekeeping. I have a written statement for the record that I will summarize, and I would be happy to answer any questions the Committee may have.

I would like to address particularly the issue of when and where peacekeeping through the United Nations is actually in the *national* interests of the United States, how we decide on a case-by-case basis what those circumstances are, and, once that threshold question is answered, how we formulate a U.N. peacekeeping strategy that protects American interests. *First*, I will examine briefly the principles underlying traditional U.N. peacekeeping. *Second,* I describe the rationale for the expansion of "peacekeeping" into new and non-traditional fields after the end of the Cold War, and *third* summarize three case studies to show the consequences. *Fourth,* I turn to the operational question of American interests directly implicated by U.N. peacekeeping, and discuss some lessons that can be drawn both from the historical record and from our contemporary experience

I. TRADITIONAL U.N. PEACEKEEPING

"Traditional" U.N. peacekeeping operations evolved when it became clear that the broad intention of the Framers of the U.N. Charter were rendered largely meaningless by the onset of the Cold War. U.N. involvement in international crises, far from being the central dispute-resolution mechanism envisioned by the Framers in Chapters VI and VII, became episodic and incidental to the main global confrontation between East and West. In part because of the extraordinarily limited dimensions within which U.N. peacekeeping was feasible, clear principles evolved to describe the elements necessary for successful U.N. operations.

First and by far the most important criterion was that all of the relevant parties to a dispute had to agree to the participation of U.N. peacekeepers in monitoring, observing or policing a truce, cease fire, or disengagement of combatants. This agreement had to encompass not only the fact of U.N. involvement, but also the scope of its mission and the operational requirements for carrying out that mission. Moreover, any party could withdraw its consent at any time, at which point the U.N. force would withdraw. The classic example of revoking consent occurred in May, 1967, when Egypt insisted on the withdrawal of the U.N. Expeditionary Force (established after the Suez Canal Crisis of 1956) from its territory along the border with Israel. The Six Day War followed.

Flowing from the principle of consent was the related notion that U.N. peacekeepers were neutral as among the parties to a conflict, not favoring one or another of them. It was understood to be elemental that the United Nations could not "take sides" in a conflict without itself becoming involved in the very situation it was trying to stabilize or resolve. Thus, U.N. peacekeepers had no right of enforcement, and their missions were deliberately non-coercive, not intended to compel any party to accept a particular settlement. U.N. rules of engagement, through long-established practice, provided for the use of force essentially only in self-defense. Because of the foregoing principles, and because they were never intended to serve as combat forces, U.N. peacekeepers were almost always only lightly armed, or unarmed, and they frequently depended on the cooperation of the parties to a dispute for logistical support or cooperation.

One can agree or disagree about the relative successes of United Nations peacekeeping during the Cold War period, but on one point there can be no serious dispute: U.N. peacekeeping had evolved over the years as a highly stylized international device, adhering to the guidelines set out above, and was considered neither adventurous nor experimental by the five Permanent Members of the Security Council or the U.N. Secretariat.

Successful implementation of United States policy objectives through the United Nations in areas as disparate as Namibia, Afghanistan, Central America and most notably the Persian Gulf Crisis of 1990-91 led many observers to believe that, by 1992, the U.N. was fully mature and capable of handling almost any assignment handed to it. Unfortunately, this reputation was not deserved, emerging as it did from a misreading of the lessons of the very successes which the U.N.'s strongest proponents urged in support of larger, more complex and more dangerous roles beyond traditional peacekeeping. Recent U.N. successes had in fact been derived from the exercise of firm, decisive American leadership within the Security Council, combined with the development of "new thinking" in Soviet foreign policy, in areas where there was a mutual advantage to cooperate.

II. BEYOND TRADITIONAL U.N. PEACEKEEPING

Buoyed by the successes mentioned above, proponents of a larger dependence of American foreign policy on the United Nations, and of a larger role in world affairs generally for the U.N., urged expansion both in the frequency of U.N. military operations and in the dramatic transformation of these missions. "Peace enforcement" was the new watchword, embodying the idea that the U.N. could impose its designs on conflicting parties, using force as appropriate. Such missions were deemed not only feasible, but virtually required of the United Nations in what was once briefly described as the "New World Order." "Peace enforcement" constituted a radical departure from traditional U.N. peacekeeping, but was often not recognized as such, or the differences were deliberately obscured. Indeed, in the most rarified of its versions, peace enforcement seemed almost like the vision of 1945 San Francisco recreated, as if the intervening forty-five-plus years simply had not happened.

United Nations peace enforcement in any particular international crisis thus assumes that there is essentially no real "peace" to "keep." As such, it assumes that the parties do not necessarily consent to the deployment of U.N. forces, that the U.N. troops may well have to "take sides" militarily to accomplish their mission, that the rules of engagement will be suitably written for such eventualities, and that manpower, armament and other preparations will be made with the prospect -- indeed, the likelihood -- of combat in mind. It should also have been assumed that national forces contributed to U.N. peace enforcement operations would be trained and ready for such a role, but this key point was never actually realized.

A further corollary of a peace enforcement mission is the realization that, once launched, and having taken sides, the U.N. may not be able to assume thereafter a neutral, peacekeeping mode at some future point. Indeed, Secretary General Boutros Boutros-Ghali recognized this point in his January, 1995, supplement to *An Agenda for Peace*, when he said "Peace-keeping and the use

been turning points in America's understanding of the capabilities and limits of the U.N. These cases highlight dramatically: (1) the fallacy of the "burdensharing" argument that the role and risks of the United States are reduced by U.N. involvement; and (2) the difficulties and dangers of embroiling the United States in peacekeeping operations that lack clear national interests.

A. SOMALIA

In contemporary thinking about U.N. peacekeeping, no operation is more important in American eyes than Somalia. I have previously written about the Clinton Administration's dramatic transformation of President Bush's original humanitarian mission into an ill-defined effort at "nation building" ("Wrong Turn in Somalia," *Foreign Affairs*, January/February, 1994), and I will not repeat that analysis here. The critical points, however, are that: (1) the UN operation did not constitute "burdensharing" for the United States to any meaningful degree, as the enthusiasts of ever-greater UN peacekeeping assert; and (2) the problem with Somalia was not so much the "exit strategy" as it was the Clinton Administration's "entry strategy."

Comments since the *Foreign Affairs* article have supported its analysis. Former Senator Bill Bradley (D., N.J.), for example, said:

> "This is not a problem of execution of policy. This is a problem of formulation of policy. And the policy formulation was ill-conceived, and it was open-ended and it was poorly planned. And that is why we are in this fix now. . . in this case, through a series of ad hoc decisions, we find ourselves in this predicament."

Former Congressman Lee Hamilton (D., Ind.) correctly observed that: "[t]he Somali experience will have a tremendous impact on a whole range of future problems. . . . In Congress, no one now wants to put troops in a dangerous area if they are not under United States' command. In any case, Congress will be very wary of approving this kind of operation."

Moreover, serious conceptual and command-and-control problems were associated with the Somalia operation, both politically and militarily. After the effective transition of responsibility from the U.S.-led Unified Task Force ("UNITAF") to the second U.N. Operation in Somalia ("UNOSOM II"), there were really separate chains of command between the U.N. forces to New York, and from the American forces to Washington. Moreover, the mission of the U.S. forces (and the U.N. force generally) was not well defined, positioning them somewhere between being traditional peacekeepers and peace enforcers. The parties did not fully consent to the former role, and the U.S. forces' ability to assume the latter role was repeatedly curtailed by decisions made in Washington, such as restrictions on the amount and use of heavy weapons and armored vehicles.

There is no question that differing command-and-control structures contributed to the confusion that led to the October 3, 1993, Mogadishu tragedy. American commanders were understandably reluctant to entrust their troops to foreign commanders with whom they shared little or no training, doctrine or experience. They correctly perceived that a U.N. command is not the same as a NATO command with a different membership. Nonetheless, American forces were in the same geographic space as United Nations forces at the same time, with unclear, overlapping and perhaps contradictory mandates from their political leadership. Whether better communications or clearer lines of authority could have averted the disaster can never be known, but, in any event, such concerns beg the larger question whether U.S. forces should have been permitted to be in such an ambiguous circumstance in the first place.

U.N. forces were completely withdrawn from Somalia under the protection of heavily armed American troops. This finale is surely ironic, since it meant that the U.N. could neither effectively enter nor leave Somalia without critical U.S. assistance. Moreover, intelligence documents and classified U.S. files in Somalia may have been compromised before the U.N. withdrawal was completed. Although it is difficult to tell from a distance if real damage was done to the United States, the incident raises questions about the larger issue of intelligence sharing, either specifically military information or more general political information, with the UN.

B. BOSNIA

Events in Bosnia and Kosovo have been as disappointing to the international community, and as frustrating for defining the role of the United Nations in conflict resolution as any in the world. Much of the U.N.'s problem stems, ironically, from the decision of the Bush Administration to defer to Europe's desire to handle the disintegration of Yugoslavia in the first instance. When

the situation began to unravel in mid-1991, Jacques Delors, then President of the European Commission, said flatly: "We do not interfere in American affairs. We hope they will have enough respect not to interfere in ours." It may well be that American acquiescence in Europe's demand sealed the fate of Bosnia beyond the possibility of subsequent diplomatic or military repair, so ineffectual and counterproductive were subsequent E.U. efforts. One important aspect of the decision to allow the Europeans to take the lead, although little understood at the time, was the elimination of NATO as a meaningful decision-making forum until well into the crisis.

One result of early European failures, although by no means the last, was their desire to have the Security Council play a major role. The U.N.'s military involvement in former Yugoslavia began in March, 1992, with Resolution 743's creation of the U.N. Protection Force ("UNPROFOR"), originally intended to help stabilize areas of conflict in heavily Serb-populated portions of Croatia where Serbian "ethnic cleansing" had first been launched. Neither side, at least initially, was terribly scrupulous about observing the agreement they had entered into, and the result was largely a traditional U.N. peacekeeping force that had no choice but to stand by while the violence continued. Despite complaints about UNPROFOR's ineffectiveness in Croatia, there were no significant calls, especially from the Europeans, to transform UNPROFOR into a peace enforcement operation. Nor did the Europeans suggest a non-U.N. force (from NATO or the Western European Union, for example) to prevent continued hostilities in Croatia.

UNPROFOR's mandate was later extended to protect the distribution of humanitarian assistance in Bosnia, as the Serbian campaign to create a "Greater Serbia" continued unabated. The lightly armed U.N. peacekeepers could themselves hardly engage in combat, and, indeed, the Europeans vigorously rejected several efforts by President Bush to take a more muscular role. In part, the European reluctance stemmed from continuing internal differences within the European Community as to the proper political and military policies to pursue. When the Security Council, in Resolutions 770 and 776, finally authorized the use of force to assist the delivery of humanitarian assistance in Bosnia, European concerns for the safety of UNPROFOR troops rendered these Resolutions ineffective. Indeed, the central issue, for many, was whether a peacekeeping operation could effectively exist in the same space and at the same time with a military force whose mission was essentially "peace enforcement."

Almost from the beginning of the humanitarian relief effort in Bosnia, American logistical, communications and other support was critical. Working with the U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees and other U.N. agencies, non-governmental organizations, and local civilian authorities, the involvement of U.S. personnel has undoubtedly saved numerous lives throughout former Yugoslavia. Direct American military participation in UNPROFOR in Bosnia, as such, however, was rejected very early on by the Bosnian Serbs. Pursuant to standard U.N. peacekeeping procedures, because the consent of all of the parties for U.S. participation was lacking, the Secretariat declined to ask for a contribution of U.S. forces to UNPROFOR. The close working relationship of U.S. and U.N. personnel in the humanitarian effort, however, shows that the distinction can readily be blurred, and could cause operational or political difficulties in the future.

One early Clinton Administration military plan, known as "lift and strike," would have ended the weapons embargo (originally adopted in Resolution 713 in September, 1991) as applied against the Bosnian government, and authorized the use of air strikes against threatening Serbian

deployments and positions. The Administration's "lift and strike" option was rejected by the NATO allies, especially Great Britain and France, in large measure because they feared the consequences for their soldiers participating in UNPROFOR in Bosnia.

Ironically, in early 1994, it was the Europeans, led by France, who pushed for NATO involvement in support of yet another E.U. peace plan, and for NATO military enforcement of Security Council resolutions. This time, it was Secretary of State Warren Christopher who argued that military intervention was "a decision with heavy consequences," that could interfere with ongoing humanitarian operations. In yet another reversal, however, the Administration joined other NATO members at the January NATO summit to endorse air strikes to "prevent the strangulation of Sarajevo" and other Bosnian enclaves. Even then, however, Prime Minister Jean Chretien of Canada remained publicly skeptical that air strikes were needed.

At the same time, the U.N. chain of command on the ground in former Yugoslavia seemed to be coming unstuck. Press reports indicated that the top U.N. commander, General Jean Cot of France (the largest troop contributor to UNPROFOR), was defying civilian Secretariat officials in New York. Cot had apparently requested that he be delegated authority to call in NATO air strikes, which request had been refused by Secretary General Boutros Boutros-Ghali, who wanted to make such decisions himself. Cot reportedly intended to open his own channel of communications directly to the Security Council. Subsequently, Boutros-Ghali demanded that France recall Cot, which it did, and informed the Security Council on January 19 1994, that he was opposed to NATO air strikes, on the strong advice of Yasushi Akashi, his representative in the Balkan region. Cot's views on air strikes were also supported by Belgian Lieutenant General Francois Briquemont, commander of UNPROFOR troops in Bosnia, who said "[w]hat we are doing here is incredible, for us coming from NATO."

In what seemed to be a dizzying series of reversals of positions, the U.S., the E.U. and the U.N. Secretary General shifted positions several times more both on air strikes and enforcement of no-fly restrictions against the Serbs, who had authority to authorize military actions, and under what circumstances they should be requested. Even when partially successful, such as the February 9, 1994, decision to compel the Bosnian Serbs to remove their heavy artillery from around Sarajevo, NATO efforts were complicated by Russian opposition. Deputy Foreign Minister Anatoly Adamishin was said to the press "[t]his is not NATO's business. It is the job of the U.N."

The downing, on February 28, 1994, of four Bosnian Serb planes, while historic as NATO's first actual use of force, did nothing to deter the Serbs from continuing their sieges of cities such as Gorazde. In another historical milestone (first use of NATO force) against ground troops), two minor air strikes against Serb positions around Goradze were launched. The Serbs were again undeterred, overrunning all but the very center of the city before finally agreeing to a cease-fire. Accounts of similar confusion of political goals, tactics, leaders could go on and on. Here, it is important to stress that continuing confusion at the political level made military planning, and especially coordination between "NATO" forces and "U.N." forces in Bosnia especially difficult. This confusion must have been especially frustrating to NATO forces in UNPROFOR, since the British and the French had tried since 1992 to impose something like NATO command-and-control structures at least in their own respective aspects of UNPROFOR's mission.

The Bosnia experience was so unsettling even to the Clinton Administration that it contributed to the deliberate minimization of the UN role during the post-Dayton phase of the Bosnia conflict, and to the overall handling of the Kosovo crisis. And yet, despite the lessons of Somalia and pre-Dayton Bosnia, the United Nations was given a leading role in the post-war occupation and attempted reconstruction and reconciliation of both Kosovo that ignored virtually everything that was learned earlier. Efforts at reconciliation between Serbs and Kosovar Albanians appear to be progressing no further with the United Nations presence than without it, and, indeed, Bosnia is still portioned *de* facto, and may well become so *de jure* with the passage of time.

UN Ambassador Richard Holbrooke has repeatedly declared -- and has so testified before this Committee -- that the UN's performance in Kosovo is potentially dispositive of how the United States views the United Nations as a whole for years to come. No one can be encouraged by the record to date.

In fact, only last month, the UN official responsible for human rights in the former Yugoslavia, Jiri Dienstbier said unambiguously: "The present situation in Kosovo just confirms the total failure to achieve the goals of the operation." Dienstbier, former Foreign Minister of the Czech Republic, was described by Agence France-Presse in Belgrade as saying that "the main problem for the UN administration in the disputed province and the NATO-led KFOR peacekeeping force was that their mission had no clearly define aims, adding that no one on the international scene seemed ready to provide one." Rarely have UN officials spoken so candidly in public about the organization's failures in an ongoing operation. One is struck by how corroborative Mr. Dienstbier's observations are to the basic problem of inadequate "entry strategies" in the creation of UN "peacekeeping" operations generally.

C. THE CONGO

The prospect of deploying another United Nations peacekeeping force in the Congo, forty years from the first ill-fated operation there, should have given the Security Council substantial pause. Following eighteen months of confused and irregular warfare throughout the "Democratic Republic of Congo," leaders of seven African nations met in New York in late January to discuss how to bring peace to this endlessly troubled region.

Rebels in eastern Congo, who in May, 1997, helped overthrow former Congo (then Zaire) President Mobutu Sese Seko and install current President Laurent Kabila, turned against him shortly thereafter, initiating the renewed conflict. Hutu Interahamwe fighters, driven into the Congo by Rwandan and Burundian Tutsi forces (representing the victims of earlier mass-killings by Hutus), are still armed and active, largely in support of Kabila. Although national leaders signed a July, 1999, agreement in Lusaka, Zambia, none of the rebel factions (supported politically and militarily by several neighboring countries) agreed. Moreover, the promised cease-fire has been routinely ignored.

The Congo is unquestionably a conflict that crosses national borders and, in the UN Charter's words, "endangers the maintenance of international peace and security." Thus, Council involvement is legitimate, and may ultimately prove helpful. Unfortunately, however, pushed by certain of the African leaders, and pulled by their own confusion about workable UN peacekeeping,

Council members may have made a bad situation worse. By deploying prematurely into a decidedly confused and unstable military and political context, the Security Council could well have impeded its ability to act effectively down the road. As in cases like Cyprus, the UN presence may simply freeze existing divisions and actually ossify political negotiations.

And that would be the good news. The other possibility is that by deploying lightly-armed observers into the eastern Congo, the Security Council risks making them hostage to the warring parties, or even becoming combatants themselves (as happened in Somalia and Bosnia). A really muscular force that could impose peace is not on the table, nor should it be in this multi-sided, highly ambiguous context, where what appear to be innocent civilians in need of protection at one point become marauding guerrillas the next. Inserting UN troops before the parties are truly reconciled, at least in the short term, is never a purely neutral act, as most combatants fully understand, and which the Council needs to understand as well.

Loose in the Security Council, however, is the idea that "it can't be a real conflict unless the UN has inserted a peacekeeping force." This is exactly backwards. First must come the essential political meeting of the minds of the parties to the conflict, then, and only then should there be consideration of instrumentalities, such as a UN peacekeeping force, to implement the agreement. Here, we can see that even the Lusaka Agreement is not being honored by the states that signed it, let alone the rebel and other forces in the Congo that did not. Apparently in recognition of these concerns, proponents of a UN force have scaled back their initial proposals to a 5,500-person observation force. But their stated expectation is that this deployment is just the precursor to a much larger force, of 15,000 or more, apparently based on the not-irrational idea that once the UN is sucked in on the ground, the logic of expanding its presence will become irreversible. One can only suppose what the American role will become once the UN presence starts to expand.

IV. U.N. PEACEKEEPING'S DIRECT CONSEQUENCES FOR THE UNITED STATES

Although U.N. peacekeeping had received considerable international attention during the Cold War, actual deployments of U.N. forces were relatively rare prior to the late 1980's. Missions were limited in scope, if not always in duration, and the financial costs to the United States were relatively insubstantial. In 1989 and early 1990, peacekeeping still remained a relatively small part of the U.N.'s overall budget. In just the last decade, however, all of that changed dramatically, as the attached chart indicates:

Budget. The most important budgetary implication of greatly expanded peacekeeping activities is caused by the difference in the level of assessments that the United States faces. For some time, the U.S. share of the U.N. regular budget has been limited to twenty-five percent (25 %). Indeed, from the inception of peacekeeping in 1940, until 1973, the U.S. assessment had been equal to its regular budget assessment, which gradually declined form the U.N.'s founding to the present twenty-five percent level. In 1973, however, when the United States felt it important to move quickly to create the Second UN Expeditionary Force in the Sinai ("UNEF II") to implement the provisions of Security Council Resolution 338. As a consequence, and because of the general weakness of the United States internationally, we were force to accept a scale of assessments for peacekeeping in which we and the other Permanent Members of the Security Council paid more

than their regular budget assessments in General Assembly Resolution 3101 (XXVIII, December 11, 1973).

Under Resolution 3101, the membership of the United Nations was divided into four groups: (A) the five Permanent Members of the Security Council; (B) specifically-named, economically developed member states (other than the Perm Five); (C) economically less developed member states; and (D) specifically-named less developed states (typically those whose percentage shares of the regular assessed budget were .01 of the total). Resolution 3101 specified that members of Group D were to pay ten percent (10 %) of their assessment rates for the regular budget; members of Group C were to pay twenty percent (20 %); members of Group B were to pay one hundred percent (100 %); and members of Group A were to pay one hundred percent (100 %) plus the amounts not otherwise apportioned. Finally, Resolution 3101 required that, within each group, the total amount apportioned was to be distributed among the group's members on the basis of the relative weight of each group members regular budget assessment, in relation to the total weight of the group.

Although UNEF II's scale was supposed to be a one-time exception to the practice of funding peacekeeping operations consistently with the regular budget scale, every subsequent peacekeeping mission has adhered to the formula adopted for UNEF II. (While the formula itself has not changed, the composition of the four groups specified in Resolution 3101 has changed because of the admission of new member governments to the U.N., and several minor modifications to the groups contained in subsequent General Assembly resolutions.

Since, under the provisions of Resolution 3101 and its successors, the overwhelming majority of the members of the General Assembly pay much less for peacekeeping than they would if the regular budget scale of assessments were followed, reverting to the pre-UNEF II practice did not seem possible for many years. Because total peacekeeping budgets were relatively low until approximately 1988, however, the differential in the scale of assessments did not have a major budgetary impact for the United States.

By contrast, as peacekeeping began to expand rapidly, the financial impact of the higher peacekeeping scale of assessments began to be felt increasingly more strongly in U.S. budgets. Accordingly, the Bush Administration decided to seek to return to the regular budget scale of assessments as soon as possible. Many in the State Department, however, opposed -- and effectively blocked any efforts to implement -- the Administration's policy. They complained that the policy would be too hard to accomplish politically, too costly diplomatically, and generally not worth the effort. The consequence, of course, was that American taxpayers were charged with paying the difference between the regular and peacekeeping scale of assessments. Instead, it was left to Congress to take action, which has now been accepted by the Clinton Administration. Whether the Administration will succeed in persuading other UN members to reduce both the US regular and peacekeeping assessments remains to be seen.

In a very real sense, this approach is similar to what Congress did in the 1980's, by refusing to appropriate the full amount of the U.S. assessed contribution throughout the U.N. system because of outrage over the anti-Western and specifically anti-American bias of so much of the organization. That approach had a very sobering effect on the U.N., and attempting to change the

U.S. assessment may have a similar impact today. In any event, it should be a bipartisan foreign policy of high priority to convince the other member governments in the U.N. to align the regular and peacekeeping scale of assessments and to reduce the U.S. level as soon as possible.

That said, one is impelled to ask why the United States, almost alone among the 184 member governments of the U.N., must bear not only the largest assessed share for peacekeeping, but also must expend apparently quite extensive Department of Defense resources at a time when all resources are constrained by tight budgets. If the Clinton Administration's own figures and calculations are correct, one can only conclude that the United States seems to be paying early and often for U.N. peacekeeping activities, once in assessed contributions appropriated by then relevant Committees, and once in in-kind amounts appropriated in one or more other Committees. Surely, this imposes an unfair burden on our government and taxpayers, who may not even be aware of this "double billing" for U.N. peacekeeping.

Command and control. Another critical underlying issue is whether U.S. forces should ever be placed under U.N. command, not just what the command structures might be. During the Cold War, a major element of the uneasy agreement among the Five Permanent Members of the Security Council known as the "Perm Five Convention" provided that armed forces of the Perm Five were not to be deployed in peacekeeping operations. Although there were a few minor exceptions to the Perm Five Convention over the years, it was generally adhered to quite closely. The Perm Five Convention was first developed by Dag Hammarskjold in preparing the first U.N. Expeditionary Force ("UNEF I") in 1956. The U.N.'s own unofficial history of peacekeeping, The Blue Helmets," notes that, in forming UNEF I, "[t]roops from the permanent members of the Security Council or from any country which, for geographical and other reasons, might have a special interest in the conflict would be excluded."

There were numerous reasons for this aspect of the Convention, stemming largely from mutual distrust as to what forces from one or another of the Perm Five might actually be doing in addition to their assigned "peacekeeping" responsibilities. There was, in addition, however, the continuing reason that not deploying their own troops gave the Perm Five a certain objectivity and detachment in leading Security Council governance of peacekeeping activities. This distance provided a perspective that inserting troops into a dangerous crisis situation would not afford. The wisdom of the Perm Five Convention is daily displayed in Bosnia, where British and French policy seems more determined by their (legitimate) concern for the safety of their troop contingents stationed with UNPROFOR than by larger geopolitical issues.

Therefore, the real policy question is whether we should not seek a revival of the Perm Five Convention that would preclude any major deployment of U.S. and other Permanent Member troops in U.N. peacekeeping, especially for those involving "peace enforcement." In endorsing this approach, the *New York Times* editorialized in 1995 that "[e]nforcement missions require the kind of firepower that only major powers can supply, but these powers do not easily subordinate their armies to U.N. command." Indeed, the Times argues for a general scaling back to traditional U.N. peacekeeping operations like monitoring cease fires, using troops from smaller and neutral states. The command-and-control problem is thus solved for real enforcement missions by assigning them "to the armies of major military powers, under Security Council mandate but national combat command." I believe that this is a sound approach.

V. LESSONS AND CONCLUSIONS

Several broad lessons emerge vividly from the foregoing. First, one can only conclude that for the past seven years, the Clinton Administration -- contrary to what is supposedly its own declared policy -- has been experimenting with U.N. peace operations and the lives of the forces involved. Especially with American soldiers at risk, the cost of that casual experimentation has been far too high. The key point is to identify those *American* interests that might be advanced by U.N. peacekeeping. We are not the World's Platonic guardians, and it is a mistake to believe the "burdensharing" argument that we have substantially less at stake when endorsing UN peacekeeping than if we undertook the same operation unilaterally. Given the importance of the United States, politically and militarily, we are inevitably looked to, especially when something goes badly wrong in a UN operation. It is simply ignoring reality not to take this fact into account at the *outset* of Security Council consideration of a proposed new peacekeeping operation.

One important test in defining American interests can, ironically, be found in the U.N. Charter itself. The Charter limits the Security Council's jurisdiction to situations adversely affecting "international peace and security." In too many of the past decade's U.N. peacekeeping both the U.S. and the U.N. have found themselves in *intra*national disputes that cannot legitimately be said to threaten "international peace and security." Simply limiting the Security Council to its actual jurisdiction alone would be a substantial policy advance, and a major protection against the United States becoming embroiled in conflicts where it has no discernable national interest.

Second, this analysis also demonstrates the centrality of firmness, decisiveness and consistency in American foreign policy decision-making. Where such important political qualities are lacking, only confusion follows, especially when policy is directed through multilateral bodies like the U.N. Political confusion leads inevitably to military confusion in the field, with potentially tragic results, such as in Mogadishu. Even where the result is not as immediately and visibly disastrous, the longer-term consequences might be even more negative. Moreover, it is foolhardy to think that any other governments can define an "entry" strategy for us. It is up to America's leadership to decide whether and when to support U.N. peacekeeping, not the U.N. Secretariat, not other Security Council members and most certainly not "international public opinion." We must know our own objectives, and if we cannot articulate them clearly, we should not hesitate to oppose new proposed peacekeeping activities, and to veto them in the Council if necessary.

Third, American rhetoric must not exceed American intentions and capabilities. Whether in the Congo or former Yugoslavia, "talking tough" is of little avail when the political will to follow it up is lacking. Rhetoric, either unilateral or multilateral, is not a substitute for a coherent foreign policy. Indeed, the opposite is more likely to be true: excessive U.S. rhetoric may well plunge us deeper and deeper into U.N. peacekeeping operations where is no or only insignificant American interests, and where the actual prospects for successful dispute resolution are equally minimal. Some long-standing tribal, ethnic, and religious struggles are simply are not susceptible to external political fixes, and it is not only feckless but politically dangerous to pretend otherwise. This is not to say that the U.S. or the U.N. might not have a useful diplomatic role to play, but this limited involvement in no way implies any need for U.N. peacekeeping.

Figure One: Pre-Clinton UN Peacekeeping Missions 1948-1992

	Start/End Dates	*Authorized Size*	*Total Cost ($ millions)*
UNMOGIP (India-Pakistan)	1948-present	45	119
UNTSO (Palestine)	1948-present	152	560
UNEF I (Sinai/Gaza Strip)	1956-67	6,073	214
UNOGIL (Lebanon)	1958	591	4
ONUC (Congo)	1960-64	19,828	400
UNSF (W. New Guinea)	1962-63	1,576	*
UNYOM (Yemen)	1963-64	189	2
UNFICYP (Cyprus)	1964-present	1,257	884
UNIPOM (India/Pakistan)	1965-66	96	2
UNEF II (Sinai/Suez)	1973-79	6,973	446
UNDOF (Golan Heights)	1974-present	1,049	697
UNIFIL (Lebanon)	1978-present	5,200	2,810
UNIIMOG (Iran/Iraq)	1988-91	399	190
UNGOMAP (Afghanistan/Pakistan)	1988-90	50	14
UNTAG (Namibia)	1989-90	7,500	400
UNAVEM I (Angola)	1989-1991	70	16
ONUCA (Central America)	1989-91	1,098	89
ONUSAL (El Salvador)	1991-95	300	107
MINURSO (W. Sahara)	1991-present	310	330
UNIKOM (Iraq-Kuwait)	1991-present	1,082	450**
UNAVEM II (Angola)	1991-1995	655	175
UNAMIC (Cambodia)	1991-1992	1,504	***
UNTAC (Cambodia)	1992-1993	22,000	1,600
UNPROFOR (Yugoslavia)	1992-1995	45,000	4,600
UNOSOM I (Somalia)	1992-1993	4,270	43
ONUMOZ (Mozambique)	1992-95	7,100	520
Total: 26 missions		**134,367 troops**	**$14.6 billion**

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** Full costs were borne by Netherlands and Indonesia.*

*** Since 1993, Kuwait has paid two-thirds of the costs of this mission.*

**** Costs of this mission were incorporated into UNTAC.*

Figure Two: Clinton UN Peacekeeping Missions 1993-31 March 2000

	Start/End Dates		*Authorized Size*	*Total Cost ($ millions)*
UNOSOM II (Somalia)	1993-1995		28,000	1,643
UNOMUR (Rwanda)	1993-1994		81	15
UNOMIG (Georgia)	1993-present		122	200
MICIVIH (Haiti) (UN/OAS mission)	1993-3/00		100	?
UNOMIL (Liberia)	1993-1997		300	85
UNMIH (Haiti)	1993-1996		1,500	316
UNAMIR (Rwanda)	1993-1996		5,500	437
UNMLT (Cambodia)	1993-1994		20	5
UNASOG (Libya/Chad)	1994		9	67
MINUGUA (Guatemala)	1/97-5/97		132	50
UNMOT (Tajikistan)	1994-present		79	30
UNAVEM III (Angola)	1995-6/97		4,220	890
UNPREDEP (Macedonia)	1995-2/99		1,106	570
UNCRO (Croatia)	1995-1996		7,000	300
UNMIBH (Bosnia)	1995-present		1,746	700
UNTAES (Croatia)	1996-1/98		5,177	350
UNMOP (Croatia)	1996-present		28	12
UNSMIH (Haiti)	1996-7/97		1,500	56
MINUGUA (Guatemala)	1/97-5/97		155	5
MONUA (Angola)	7/97-2/99		1,326	210
UNTMIH (Haiti)	8/97-11/97		250	20
MONUA (Angola)	7/97-2/99		220	95
MIPONUH (Haiti)	12/97-3/00		300	40
UNPSG (Croatia)	1/98-10/98		233	70
MINURCA (Central African Republic)	4/98-2/00		1,360	73
UNOMSIL (Sierra Leone)	7/98-10/99		50	40
UNMIK (Kosovo)	6/99-present		3,900	300*
UNAMSIL (Sierra Leone)	10/99-present	11,100	11,100	800*
UNTAET (East Timor)	10/99-present	10,600	10,600	800*
MONUC (Congo)	11/99-present		5,537	400*
MICAH (Haiti)	3/00-present		100	9*
Total: 31 missions			**91,751 troops**	**$8.58 billion**

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*Estimated annual cost when fully deployed.